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ABSTRACT
Passwords are still a mainstay of various security systems, as well
as the cause of many usability issues. For end-users, many of these
issues have been studied extensively, highlighting problems and
informing design decisions for better policies and motivating re-
search into alternatives. However, end-users are not the only ones
who have usability problems with passwords! Developers who are
tasked with writing the code by which passwords are stored must
do so securely. Yet history has shown that this complex task of-
ten fails due to human error with catastrophic results. While an
end-user who selects a bad password can have dire consequences,
the consequences of a developer who forgets to hash and salt a
password database can lead to far larger problems. In this paper we
present a first qualitative usability study with 20 computer science
students to discover how developers deal with password storage
and to inform research into aiding developers in the creation of
secure password systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade usable security research has focused mainly on
issues faced by end-users. In their paper “Developers are not the
enemy”, Green and Smith [32] argue that usable security research
needs to be extended to study and help developers who have to
interact with complex security APIs.
Storing and authenticating user login data is one of the most com-
mon tasks for software developers [45]. At the same time, this task
is prone to security issues [32]. Frequent compromises of password
databases highlight that developers often do not store passwords
securely - quite often storing them in plain text [20, 23, 38, 78].
To gain an understanding on where and why developers strug-
gle to store passwords securely, we conducted the first usability
study of developer behavior when tasked with writing code to store
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passwords and authenticate users. Since this is the first work in this
domain, we chose to conduct a qualitative study with the ability to
conduct in-depth interviews to get feedback from developers.
We were interested in exploring two particular aspects: Firstly,
do developers get things wrong because they do not think about
security and thus do not include security features (but could if they
wanted to)? Or do they write insecure code because the complexity
of the task is too great for them? Secondly, a common suggestion
to increase security is to offer secure defaults. This is echoed by
Green and Smith [32] who call for secure defaults for crypto-APIs.
Based on this suggestion, we wanted to explore how developers
use and perceive frameworks that attempt to take the burden off
developers.
To offer insights into these questions, we conducted three pilot
studies and a final 8-hour qualitative development study with 20
computer science students. The use of computer science students for
software engineering studies is considered an acceptable proxy for
developers [7, 35, 57, 69]. The students were given a role-playing
scenario in which they were tasked to include registration and
authentication code into an existing stub of a social networking
application. To gather insights into task framing, half of the students
were told to store the passwords securely and the other half were
not. This latter group of students would have to decide on their
own volition whether, since they were writing code for storing
user passwords, they should store them securely. Also, one half of
each group was given the Spring Framework to work with, which
contains helper classes for password storage, while the other half
had to use the Java Server Faces (JSF) Framework in which they
would have to implement everything themselves.
Our key insights are as follows:
• Security knowledge does not guarantee secure software:
Just because participants had a good understanding of secu-
rity practices did not mean that they applied this knowledge
to the task. Conversely, we had participants with very little
security knowledge who created secure implementations.
• More usable APIs are not enough: Even when APIs offer
better support for developers with ready-to-use methods
which implement secure storage correctly, this is not enough
if these methods are opt-in, as they were with all password
storage APIs we found.
• Explicitly requesting security is necessary: Despite the
fact that storage of passwords should self-evidently be a
security sensitive task, participants who were not explicitly
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told to employ secure storage stored the passwords in plain
text.
• Functionality first, security second: Very similarly to
end-users, most of our participants focused on the func-
tionality and only added security as an afterthought - even
those who were primed for security.
• Continuous learning: Even participants who attempted to
store passwords securely often did so insecurely because the
methods they learnt are now outdated. Despite knowing that
security is a fast moving field, participants did not update
their knowledge.
• Conflicting advice: Different standards and security rec-
ommendations make it difficult for developers to decide what
is the right course of action, which creates frustration.
Since this is also one of the first studies of security APIs, we also
gained several insights into running such studies which might be
helpful for the community.
• Think Aloud: While Think Aloud is considered a good
method to gather insights into study participants’ mental
process in end-user studies, we did not find it as useful for
developer studies. Both the length and the complexity of
the tasks seem to be a hindrance. In addition, evaluating
Think-Aloud data is very work intensive.
• Task framing: Developer studies need to take great care
when framing their tasks. Giving developers very small fo-
cused tasks concerning crypto libraries will not uncover
most of the problems we saw in the more realistic context
of complex tasks, which mix security and functionality de-
velopment. Both types of studies are worthwhile; however,
the decision needs to be taken consciously according to the
goal of the studies.
• Qualitative research reveals essential insights: Prior re-
search often focused on only examining the end-solution and
analyzing survey responses in developer studies. We found
that qualitative investigations can dig deeper and reveal mis-
conceptions and lack of knowledge even if the solutions are
secure.
2 RELATEDWORK
Passwords
There is a huge body of usable security research into passwords [9,
17, 40, 44, 62–64, 74–77, 79]. Comparatively few studies have been
done analyzing how developers cope with end-user password stor-
age.
Bonneau and Preibusch [10] carried out an empirical analysis of
password implementations deployed on the Internet. They evalu-
ated 150 websites which offered free user accounts and relied on
user-chosen textual passwords for authentication. All of the sites
showed inconsistent implementation choices impacting security.
Bonneau and Preibusch found evidence that websites storing pay-
ment details as well as user data provided appropriate password
security. By contrast, the worst security practices were found on
content websites having few security incentives. Most of them
suffered from a lack of encryption to protect transmitted pass-
words. Further, storage of cleartext passwords in server databases
with little protection of passwords against brute force attacks were
commonly-applied practices. Bonneau and Preibusch concluded
that these sites deploy passwords primarily for psychological rea-
sons, both as a justification for collecting marketing data and as a
way to build trusted relationships with customers.
Acar et al. [3] conducted an experiment with active GitHub
users in order to explore the validity of recruiting convenience
samples as representatives for professional developers in security
related developer studies. One task covered secure storage of user
credentials. A number of participants stored the passwords in plain
text or used unsafe hashing functions or static salts. Neither the self-
reported status as student or professional developer, nor the security
background of the participants correlated with the functionality or
security of their solutions.
Prechelt [50] performed an exploratory study comparingWeb de-
velopment platforms (Java EE, Perl, and PHP). Nine teams compris-
ing professional developers had 30 hours to implement aWeb-based
application. The resulting applications were analyzed with regard
to several aspects, such as usability, functionality, reliability, secu-
rity, structure, etc. The findings suggested that wide differences
in platform characteristics were presented in some dimensions,
although possibly not in others.
Finifter and Wagner [19] conducted a further evaluation of the
code produced in the competition of Prechelt. They searched for cor-
relations between programming languages/framework support for
security aspects and the number of vulnerabilities. They did not find
a relationship between a programming language and application
security. However, automatic features were effective at preventing
vulnerabilities in general, but not for secure password storage. Al-
though many of the used frameworks provided “automatic” support
for storing end-users’ passwords securely, the developers did not
employ them. These findings motivated us to conduct a qualitative
study to gain deeper insights into why developers do not store
passwords securely.
Bau et al. [6] explored Web application vulnerabilities. They
used a metric to search for correlations between the vulnerability
rate of a Web application and (1) the nature of a developer team
(startup company vs. freelancers), (2) security background knowl-
edge of developers, and (3) programming languages. They found
that Web applications implemented with PHP or by freelancers
showed higher rates of vulnerabilities. Regarding password stor-
age, they observed significant discrepancies between the expertise
and the resulting implementation solutions of freelancers. They
concluded that further research is required to better understand
developers and their practices. As with the previous study, this
study only looked at the code and said nothing about the thoughts
of the developers.
Usability of Crypto APIs
In order to protect sensitive data processed by current applications,
developers need to use cryptographic APIs. However, due to their
complexity, developers often struggle to use them correctly.
Egele et al. [16] investigated the misuse of cryptographic APIs
for Android application developers. Of the more than 11 000 An-
droid apps analyzed, 88% featured at least one of six cryptographic
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errors. Further, Lazar et al. [42] found that 80% of the analyzed Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) resulted from misuse of
cryptographic APIs by developers.
Nadi et al. [45] investigated the problems developers face when
using cryptography APIs. They analyzed the top 100 Stack Overflow
questions regarding cryptography questions and afterwards con-
ducted a study with 11 developers recruited from Stack Overflow.
They also analyzed 100 randomly selected public GitHub reposi-
tories using Java cryptography APIs and surveyed 37 developers.
They identified poor documentation, lack of cryptography knowl-
edge, and bad API design as the main obstacles developers struggle
against.
Stylos and Myers [68] conducted studies with developers to
examine API design usability with regard to method placement.
They created two different versions of three different APIs and asked
ten developers to implement three small tasks. They found that
developers solved a task faster when using APIs in which the classes
from which they started their exploration included references to
the other classes they needed.
Green and Smith [32] discussed the issue of security API usability
providing examples and gave high-level recommendations to reduce
developer errors. Gorski et al. [29] analyzed studies investigating
API usability and extracted usability characteristics relevant for
security API usability.
Fahl et al. [18] conducted qualitative interviews with software
developers who deployed malfunctioning SSL issues revealing us-
ability problems in the API design. They presented a framework in
order to help developers implement secure software.
Security behavior in general was investigated by Redmiles et
al. [54, 55]. They revealed that people with IT skills accept security
advice from different sources as well as reject advice for different
reasons, such as handing responsibility to other actors.
Acar et al. [2] examined whether different documentation re-
sources influence the security of programmers’ code. They con-
ducted a between-subjects laboratory study, where developers were
provided with a skeleton Android app and asked to complete four
programming tasks based on the skeleton: the storage of data, the
use of HTTPS, the use of ICC, and the use of permissions. Their
main finding was that developers who were assigned to use Stack
Overflow created less secure code.
Acar et al. [1] also conducted a quantitative evaluation of the
usability of several crypto APIs. They conducted an online study
with open source Python developers to test the following Python
crypto libraries: cryptography.io, Keyczar, PyNaCl, M2Crypto, and
PyCrypto. They tested symmetric and asymmetric encryption and
key generation as well as certificate validation. Their tasks were de-
signed to be short enough so that the uncompensated participants
would be likely to complete them before losing interest, but still
complex enough to enable errors to be made. The authors conclude
that, while cryptographic libraries should offer a simple and conve-
nient interface, this is not enough. Developers also need to support
a range of common tasks and provide accessible documentation
with secure, easy-to-use code examples. However, due to the short
task duration and online nature of the study, the authors could not
do an analysis of the causes. The qualitative nature of our study, in
combination with the much longer task, allows us to give a deeper
analysis. In particular we show that task framing has a huge effect.
Our study differs in several ways from the studies of Acar et al.
In their first study they examined the effect of information sources
on the security of the code. In their second study they analyzed
the usability of crypto APIs for encryption. We are examining
password storage and whether the task description and priming
participants help in producing secure code. We are also looking
at the difference between different APIs; however, we are using
qualitativemethods to gain deeper insights into the rationale behind
developers’ behavior.
3 STUDY DESIGN
We designed a study through which we could gain insights into
the development process of password storage and user authenti-
cation code. Specifically, we wanted to study the effect of telling
participants that we want them to store the end-user passwords
securely as opposed to them having to think of security on their
own. Additionally, we wanted to see the effect of giving developers
a framework which offers inbuilt functionality for securely storing
passwords. Such a framework would remove the burden on the
developer of having to choose a secure salt and hash function, as
well as knowing that iterations are recommended.
As is common practice in usability studies, we created a role-
playing scenario to give the participants context. We asked the
participants to imagine that they are working in a team to create a
social networking platform and that they are responsible for cre-
ating the code for user registration and user authentication. We
selected two different Web frameworks with different levels of
support for secure password storage and divided the participants
between these two frameworks (see Table 1).We refer to [19], where
a taxonomy of categorization of levels that support a framework is
explained in further detail. We chose frameworks with two levels
of support in our analysis: (1) manual, the weakest level of support
in which developers have to write their own salting and hashing
code using just crypto primitives, and (2) opt-in, a framework which
offers a secure implementation option, which can be used by devel-
opers if they think of it or find it. We did not find any framework
which offers the level of opt-out support for password storage.1
In order to get substantive results we usedmultiple data-collection
approaches for the study: (1) an implementation task which was
logged in its entirety, (2) a survey, and (3) a semi-structured in-
terview. Since we were interested in qualitative data, we opted to
conduct the study in a laboratory setting instead online. Although
online studies have the advantage of letting people work in their
natural environment, it is harder to monitor all their activity and
the in-person interview is harder to conduct. In our usability lab,
we provided the setting, including software and hardware, and
thus were able to track all actions of the participants. Second, we
had full control of time constraints and could avoid any kind of
unnecessary disturbance during the implementation task. Finally,
we could ensure that participants did not get outside help without
such assistance being logged and the record available for analysis.
Participants were briefed about the procedure and purpose of the
study and told that they could quit at any time. Half the participants
1This is probably due to the fact that it would be very hard to stop a developer from
storing arbitrary strings in plain text. Our results show that this would, however, be a
very desirable level of support to reach.
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were told that the study was about the usability of Java frameworks,
while the other half were told the study was about secure password
storage. Thus, half the participants were subjected to a deception
task. Only after completing the survey were these particular partic-
ipants informed about the true purpose of the study. This deception
was necessary since telling everyone that we were studying pass-
word storage would have primed those participants who had not
been explicitly told to securely store the passwords, thus making it
impossible to discover whether they had thought of secure storage
on their own. For those with the explicit task we did not need to
use any deception. These participants were told the true purpose of
the study in the Introductory Text and in the Task Description.
Both groups completed a short pre-questionnaire about their ex-
pectation of how difficult the task would be and a self-assessment
of their programming skills. After finishing the implementation
task, participants completed a further survey and were interviewed
about their implementation, their experience solving the task, and
their thoughts on the usability of the framework they worked on.
Finally, both groups were debriefed, with the non-primed partic-
ipants additionally being informed about the true purpose of the
study.
In the following section, the rationales behind the choices made
in the study design will be discussed.
3.1 Language and Framework Selection
Several statistics based on diverse analytical data indicate Java as
one of the most widely employed server-side programming lan-
guages for applications and in theWeb [36, 46, 47, 53, 71, 72]. Java is
also the main programming language taught at our university; thus
we chose Java as the programming language for our experiments.
To compare the different levels of support offered by frameworks
and their APIs, we conducted an analysis of the most popular Web
frameworks, based on the data gathered from the open source plat-
form HotFrameworks [28]. HotFrameworks combines scores from
GitHub [24] (number of stars a git repository has for a framework)
and Stack Overflow [66] (questions tagged with a name of a frame-
work) and creates a statistic of the most popular Web frameworks.
Additionally, we used Google Trends [13] in order to verify the
data offered by HotFrameworks. Google Trends provides a good
overview regarding the development of interest in frameworks
worldwide. We concentrated on frameworks that have been popu-
lar for the past five years.
We selected Spring and Java Server Faces (JSF) as the most
suitable Web frameworks for our study in terms of popularity and
level of support for secure end-user password storage as explained
above. In order to store a password securely with Spring, the devel-
oper can make use of Spring Security’s PasswordEncoder interface.
By contrast, participants implementing an application with JSF have
to manually implement secure password storage or decide to inte-
grate a library on their own.
3.2 Participants
Researchers conducting computer science studies with professional
developers often encounter obstacles, such as high costs and low
response rate [41]. In the domain of software engineering, there are
multiple studies examining the applicability of students as proxies
for developers [7, 35, 57, 69]. While there are caveats, on the whole
it is considered acceptable to do exploratory research with students.
Furthermore, the recent work of Acar et al. indicates that this holds
true in the field of security software engineering [2, 3].
Therefore, we recruited 7 Bachelor and 13 Master students of
computer science via the computer science mailing list and posters
in the CS buildings (see Appendix A). A demographics table can be
found in the Appendix, Table 6.
All applicants filled out a short questionnaire about their famil-
iarity with Java and the APIs used in the study (see Appendix B).
Since the Bachelor program in Computer Science at the Univer-
sity of Bonn is completely in German and the Master program is in
English, we gave our participants the opportunity to decide which
language they wished to use for the study, including the written
study task and the interview. As a prerequisite for our study, famil-
iarity with Java and the integrated development environment (IDE)
Eclipse were required.
3.3 Task Design
Our goal was to design a Web development task that was short
enough to be solved in one working day but also long enough to
hide the fact that secure password storage was the only thing of
interest to us. We also wanted a longer task than the recent API
comparisons of Acar et al. [1] to observe participants having to
potentially prioritize functionality or security. This is similar to
the real world, where functionality of an application is the primary
task and security is the secondary task [58, 59, 80].
As previously mentioned, we asked participants to imagine they
were part of a team working on creating a social networking site for
our university. While our aim was not to quantitatively compare
variables, we nonetheless studied four variants on how the study
was conducted (see Table 1). We were interested in the qualitative
feedback on Spring and JSF as well as when we directly asked
students to implement secure password storage (henceforth called
the primed group) and when they were not prompted (henceforth
called the non-primed group).
The application which the participants were supposed to extend
was designed with the standard Model-View-Controller pattern.
The front end was provided and the database back end fully imple-
mented and documented. To ease the integration, students were
given an illustration of the layers for the whole application and
documentation of the existing Java classes with implementation
hints (see Appendix F, G). To facilitate a natural process, we explic-
itly allowed participants to use any kind of information source that
could be found on the Internet.
Since there is still very little knowledge on how to design tasks
for developer studies in the security realm, we conducted three pilot
studies to refine the task design. The following three subsections
briefly describe differences and improvements of the pilot studies.
Pilot Study 1. In order to test our task design, we conducted a
pilot study with 4 participants: 2 Computer Science PhD students of
the Usable Security and Privacy group at the University of Bonn, and
2 Computer Science Master students in their 1st and 3rd semester
at the University of Bonn. The main purpose of the first pilot study
was to test timing, the understanding of the task, and to see if the
students managed to complete the task. In this pilot study we only
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No. Framework Level of Support (Non-)Priming Label
1 JSF manual Priming JP
2 JSF manual Non-Priming JN
3 Spring opt-in Priming SP
4 Spring opt-in Non-Priming SN
Table 1: Combination of 4 Different Scenarios in the Study
tested the priming version of the study since, a) the students knew
our group and could not have been fooled into believing the non-
priming scenario, and b) the three measurement goals can more
reliably be achieved if students definitively attempt the security
part of the task.
We set the overall time threshold of the study to 8 hours. This
time included a reception phase, an implementation task, a survey,
an interview, a debriefing session, and a break of half an hour.
Participants were compensated with 80 euros (10 euros per hour).
We also asked our participants to “Think-Aloud”, since this is a
common method in end-user research to gain insights into the
thoughts of participants.
Participants had to write the code for the registration and an
authentication part of the Web application with one of the two
Web frameworks: Spring (PhD 1 and Master student 1) or JSF (PhD
2 and Master student 2). Registering an end-user means storing
the user’s data, which he/she provides through an interface to a
database. Authenticating the end-user means to log in the user with
his/her credentials provided in the registration process.
Due to hardware problems, we had to exclude one participant
(PhD student 2) from the study analysis. Participants indicated high
skill levels in Java programming andWeb development. On average,
PhD student 1 and the first Master student needed about 7 hours
to solve the task. The second Master student did not implement a
functional solution for the authentication task within the 8 hours.
Based on our observations, we decided that our first design inter-
action was too complex and that students had difficulty completing
the task in time. Because of this we decided to remove the authen-
tication task and to focus entirely on password storage during the
registration process.
We also found that, unlike in end-user studies, the Think-Aloud
method did not provide us with valuable results. Most of partici-
pants did not talk at all during programming. If they were talking,
they only addressed topics apart from our security focus. They
stated obvious things, such as searching for a term, or items which
were discussed in the interview after solving the task anyway. It
seems that both the length and complexity of the task makes Think
Aloud problematic. We therefore removed this element of the study.
This also opened up the possibility of having multiple participants
conduct the study at the same time.
All further studies were executed in our usability lab with 9
participants and 1 supervisor. The workspaces were set up in a way
that participants could not see one another’s work and they were
equipped with noise canceling headphones to minimize distrac-
tions.
Pilot Study 2. In the second pilot study, participants had to
implement the registration part of the Web application. As before,
we only used the priming scenario. We invited 2 Computer Science
Master students from the University of Bonn and 1 Computer Sci-
ence Master student assistant from the Usable Security and Privacy
group of the University of Bonn. While the student assistant was
compensated with 60 euros (we expected that the implementation
of the registration task would not exceed 6 hours), the Master stu-
dents worked on the task in the course of a Usable Security and
Privacy Lab. Thus, they were compensated with ECTS-credits2.
On average, participants took 5 hours and 30minutes to complete
the study. We observed that the database connection in particular
was costing the participants a lot of time. Since this was not our
primary interest, we added some hints for this part of the task so
participants would not get lost in it.
We estimated that the streamlined study would last about 4
hours. Since we wanted to recruit as many students as possible, we
announced the next phase of the study as lasting approximately 4-5
hours, 8 hours max. (with a break of half an hour) and announced a
payment of 60 euros. As the next subsection will show, this turned
out to be a mistake.
Pilot Study 3. We invited 7 participants to what was supposed
to be the first round of the main study. They were randomly as-
signed to the priming/non-priming and Spring/JSF scenarios. On
average participants took part in the study for about 5 hours and 30
minutes. However, we noticed that, unlike in the 8-hour pilot study,
participants who did not complete the task within the estimated
4-5 hours got frustrated and gave up. We received non-functional
and insecure solutions, and the interviews indicated that timing
was a major factor for this. Also, unlike in the previous two groups,
some participants did not know how to verify that they had solved
the task. An interesting effect occurred in the non-primed group.
After solving the task, participants were asked to complete a survey
containing questions about secure password storage. Upon read-
ing the questions, some participants went back into the code and
implemented secure storage.
Due to these critical issues, we discarded the results from these
7 students and created another iteration of the study design. Firstly,
we revised the task description to make it clear when the task was
functionally complete. The final version of the task description
and implementation hints can be found in the Appendix E, F, G.
Secondly, we revised the time constraints on the notices for the
study: “The study will last 8 hours.” We decided to allow students
to go back into the code after reading the questions in the survey
but built in logging mechanisms to track when this happened. This
2Participation was still voluntary and the student could have chosen a non-study task
to comply with ethical guidelines.
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actually gave us very valuable data that showed that the participants
had the skills, but just did not think they were necessary.
To give stronger incentives, we increased the payment for partic-
ipation to 100 euros. Additionally, we provided snacks and refresh-
ments to ensure participants’ contentment. Previously, students
had been asked to bring their own food.
After this third pilot study the task design worked well, with the
20 students completing the study as planed. Our study was con-
ducted in May 2017. The pilot studies were conducted in December
2016 and April 2017.
3.4 Survey and Interview
Once the implementation task had been finished or abandoned,
participants had to fill out an exit survey. After that they were
interviewed about their task solution and their knowledge about
end-user password storage security mechanisms. The interview
and survey questions can be found in the Appendix C and D.
Survey. For the survey we applied the suggested approach
of [21] to use seven-point rating scales instead of five-point scales.
We asked participants for their demographics and programming
experience. They also had to indicate their experience with the
APIs employed in the study.
In order to address user satisfaction, we wanted to find out
how easy or difficult the implementation task was perceived by
participants (experience) in comparison to how easy or difficult
they thought it was going to be (expectation), a method suggested
in [4, 70]. Therefore, we asked participants a Single Ease Question
(SEQ) [60, 61] after they had read the study task description, but
before they had started to work on the implementation task. Addi-
tionally, they had to answer the SEQ after they had finished the
implementation task.
Interview. After participants had completed the exit survey,
they were interviewed about their implemented solutions and end-
user password storage security mechanisms. They were also asked
what they would do if they were working for a company and were
given exactly the same task with the same description and time
constraints. Specifically, they were asked whether they would have
solved the task in the exact same way as they solved it in the study.
Regarding the priming and non-priming scenarios, both sets of
interview questions sets were similar apart from those questions
illustrated in Table 2. The primed participants, who were told to
solve their task securely, were asked whether they would have
done this if they had not been explicitly requested to do so. The
non-primed participants were asked about security awareness in
any case, regardless of how they solved the task.
A single trained researcher conducted all 20 qualitative inter-
views. The interview sessionswere audio-recorded. After the record-
ings were transcribed, two researchers independently coded all
interviews using Ground-Theory and compared their final code
books using the inter-coder agreement. The Cohen’s [11] kappa co-
efficient (κ) for all themes was 0.81. A value above 0.75 is considered
a good level of coding agreement [22].
Participant states to have stored the end-user password
securely not securely
Primed
Group
“Do you think you would
have stored the end-user
password securely, if you
had not been told about it”?
-
Non-
Primed
Group
“How did you become aware
of the necessity of security
in the task? At which point
did you decide to store
end-user password
securely?”
“Were you aware that the
task needed a secure
solution?”
Table 2: Questions Asked Depending on the Priming /Non-
Priming Scenarios
3.5 Evaluating Participants’ Solutions
For the usability analysis of the Spring and JSF APIs, we used the
ISO usability specification as a basis, i.e., "the extent to which a
product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of
use" [67]. Both the survey and the interview covered the satisfaction
aspect. To specify the efficiency, we measured the time a participant
needed to solve the task. For specifying the effectiveness, we ex-
amined the functionality and security of the participant’s program
code. If the end-user was able to register theWeb application, mean-
ing that his/her data provided through the interface was stored to
a database, then the task was solved functionally to an adequate
degree. In order to store end-user passwords securely, participants
had to hash and salt the end-user passwords [30].
Nowadays, GPUs can run billions of instructions per second [48].
Consequently, the one-way hash functions SHA1 [15, 52] and MD5 [56]
can be calculated extremely quickly. Thus, these algorithms are no
longer considered as sufficiently secure in most cases, as demon-
strated by several serious password leaks within major organiza-
tions [20, 23, 38]. To counter this problem, more computationally in-
tensive password hashing schemes (PHSs), like PBKDF2 (Password
Based Key Derivation Function) [37], bcrypt [51] and scrypt
[49] have been proposed. These algorithms apply the idea of key
stretching to increase the computation time for testing each possible
password (key) by iterating the hash of the salted password [39].
Due to the presence of cheap and parallel hardware, the widely
used PBKDF2 and bcrypt are vulnerable to massively-parallel at-
tacks [33, 34, 48]. In order to counter these attacks, memory-hard
PHSs were introduced, since fast memory is considered expensive.
Scrypt is a memory-hard PHS, but it is vulnerable to other types of
attacks such as cache-timing and garbage-collector attacks [26, 27].
By contrast Argon2 [8], the winner of the Password Hashing Com-
petition (PHC) [12], provides a defense against such attacks and
can be viewed as the state of the art in the design of memory-hard
functions. Other promising PHSs can be found in [25, 33].
Although we are aware of the fact that memory-hard functions
like scrypt and Argon2 are stronger than bcrypt and PBKDF2, we
decided not to penalize participants for using current standards [31].
While NIST indicates the use of a suitable one-way key derivation
function for password storage as a requirement to be followed
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strictly, the usage of memory-hard functions is recommended as
particularly suitable. As an example for a suitable key derivation
function PBKDF2 is still suggested with an iteration count of at least
10 000. In previous specifications [73], NIST even recommended
an iteration count of at least 1 000. Since our study was conducted
in May 2017, only a draft [30] of NIST’s current specification was
available to our participants. Therefore, we accepted a solution
with at least 1 000 iterations; however bonus points were awarded
if participants changed the iteration count to at least 10 000.
In order to store a password securely with Spring, developers
can make use of Spring Security’s cryptography module spring-
security-crypto3, which contains its own password encoder. De-
velopers can simply import an implementation of the password
encoder with a hash function they prefer. Although an implemen-
tation of scrypt is available, the official Spring Security Reference
refers to bcrypt as the preferred hash function [5]. The provided
implementation uses a cost parameter of 10 resulting in 210 = 1 024
key expansion iterations by default. Originally Provos and Mazieres
proposed a cost parameter of 6 for end-user and 8 for administra-
tor passwords [51]. While these values are considered outdated
today, recent works use the cost parameter 12 for bcrypt as a
common choice for analysis [14, 33, 43, 81]. By using Spring Secu-
rity’s bcrypt implementation, a random salt value of 16 bytes is
integrated by default as well. Again, we did not wish to penalize
participants for using standards of frameworks, and so we rated
parameter defaults of Spring Security’s bcrypt implementation as
secure.
By contrast, an application implemented solely with JSF can
either be extended by Spring Security, or the developer can im-
plement his or her own solution for secure password storage. For
instance, he or she could make use of Java’s Cryptography Exten-
sions (JCEs). A random salt value has to be implemented by the
developer as well. We did not restrict participants in their choice of
how to implement secure password storage, neither for Spring nor
for JSF.
To summarize, we rated security of end-user password storage
under different assessment criteria. The highest possible score is 7
points, consisting as follows [31, 65]:
(1) The end-user password is salted (+1) and hashed (+1).
(2) The derived length of the hash is at least 160 bits long (+1).
(3) The iteration count for key stretching is at least 1 000 (+0.5) or
10 000 (+1) for PBKDF2 and at least 210 = 1 024 for bcrypt (+1).
(4) A memory-hard hashing function is used (+1).
(5) The salt value is generated randomly (+1).
(6) The salt is at least 32 bits in length (+1).
As explained above, in the following analysis we refer to solu-
tions which achieved 6 or 7 points as secure solutions. Solutions
which earned 6 points followed industry best practices. In other
words, from a usability perspective, these participants did all one
could realistically expect from them. It must be stressed, though,
that no participant received all 7 points and thus did not become
aware of recent academic results showing that memory-hard hash-
ing functions are necessary for best security [8, 33].
3since Spring Security 3.1
3.6 Ethics
Our institution does not have a formal IRB process for computer sci-
ence studies, but the study protocols were cleared with the projects
ethics officer. Our study also complied with the strict German pri-
vacy regulations. The data was collected anonymously and our
participants were provided with a consent form that had all in-
formation on their recorded data. The participants were informed
about withdrawing their data during or after the study.
4 RESULTS
We report statements of specific participants by labeling them
JP/JN/SP/SN, from 1 to 5 each, according to their scenarios from Ta-
ble 1. Table 3 summarizes participants’ security expertise identified
from the exit survey. The maximum security expertise to achieve is
28. Participants’ security expertise ranged from 8 to 23.
15 participants stored passwords before working on the study
task. Despite this fact, many of them answered, in the question
concerning their knowledge of secure password storage, that they
have little understanding of this topic.
Further, participants identified their experience with the frame-
work, which is discussed in section 4.5 in detail.
4.1 Functionality and Security
Table 4 summarizes all solutions from our participants in terms
of functionality, security, and implementation time. Not a single
participant from the non-primed groups, either working with JSF
or Spring, stored the end-user passwords securely in the database.
The participants’ implementation time in the non-primed groups
varied from about 2 to 6.5 hours. From the primed groups, SP1,
SP3, SP4, and JP4 were able to store the password securely with
a security score of 6. However, none of the participants used a
memory-hard hashing function and achieved all 7 points. SP1, SP3,
and SP4 used bcrypt with a 192-bit password hash and a 128-bit
salt. Their implementation time varied from about 3 hours to 7
hours. All of them made use of Spring Security’s PasswordEncoder
interface.
JP2 and JP4 both used PBKDF2with different algorithms, iteration
counts and salt lengths. Their implementation time varied from
about 3 hours to 4 hours. JP2 employed SHA256 with a hash length
of 512 bits, 1 000 iterations and a 256-bit salt. JP4 used SHA1 with
a hash length of 160 bits, 20 000 iterations and a smaller salt of 64
bits. By contrast, JP3 used the hash function SHA256 with only one
iteration and without salting.
Some participants changed the length constraints of the pass-
word. JP1 and JP5 used 3-50 characters as length constraint for
the end-user password. SN4 and SP1 decided on a password length
greater than 6 characters, while SN1, SN2, and SP5 chose a password
length constraint with a minimum of 8 characters.
4.2 Choice of Hash Function
Our participants chose hash functions based on different factors.
SP1 noted that he chose to work with bcrypt:
“A lot of forums say that is very secure and very up
to date and has a high vote in some cryptography
website. [...] I find it trust-able, the Stack Overflow
and cryptography forums.”
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Participant Security Expertise Knowledge of Secure
Password Storage
Stored Passwords Before Framework supported me Framework prevented me
Not knowledgeable at all (4) -
Very knowledgeable (28)1
Not knowledgeable at all (1) -
Very knowledgeable (7)
Strongly disagree (1) -
Strongly agree (7)
Strongly disagree (1) -
Strongly agree (7)
JN1 15 3 ✗ 4 4
JN2 12 2 ✓ 4 4
JN3 16 5 ✗ 3 3
JN4 21 6 ✓ 4 4
JN5 13 3 ✓ 4 4
JP1 13 2 ✓ 3 1
JP2 23 5 ✓ 2 4
JP3 19 6 ✓ 3 2
JP4 15 2 ✓ 1 5
JP5 13 2 ✓ 2 6
SN1 16 6 ✓ 1 1
SN2 23 5 ✓ 1 4
SN3 17 4 ✓ 4 4
SN4 19 7 ✗ 1 7
SN5 10 1 ✗ 4 4
SP1 15 4 ✗ 7 1
SP2 14 5 ✓ 1 3
SP3 8 2 ✓ 7 1
SP4 12 4 ✓ 7 2
SP5 16 4 ✓ 4 4
Table 3: Participants’ Security Expertise, Password Knowledge and Framework Support
1 We determined the security expertise from Q1-Q4 (see Appendix). We combined the answers of the participants to Q1-Q4 by adding up the numbers of their responses, whereby the
answer for Q2 had to be reversed for consistency reasons. S=Spring, J=JSF, P=Priming, N=Non-Priming (See Table 1 for labeling.)
Time Functionality Security
Hashing Salt
(hh:mm) Storage working Hashfunction
(at most +2)
Length (bits)
(+1 if ≥ 160)
Iteration count
(at most +1)
Used library
(at most +2)
Length (bits)
(+1 if ≥ 32)
Total
(7)
JN1 06:26 ✗ 0
JN2 04:05 ✓ 0
JN3 03:01 ✓ 0
JN4 04:11 ✗ 0
JN5 05:30 ✗ 0
JP1 04:55 ✓ 0
JP2 03:12 ✓ PBKDF2(SHA256) 512 1 000 SecureRandom 256 5.5
JP3 05:29 ✓ SHA256 256 1 2
JP4 04:12 ✓ PBKDF2(SHA1) 160 20 000 SecureRandom 64 6
JP5 06:32 ✓ 0
SN1 03:15 ✓ 0
SN2 02:24 ✓ 0
SN3 02:01 ✓ 0
SN4 04:01 ✓ 0
SN5 04:50 ✓ 0
SP1 03:15 ✓ BCrypt 192 1 024 Spring Library 128 6
SP2 01:54 ✓ MD5 128 1 1
SP3 07:00 ✗ BCrypt 192 1 024 Spring Library 128 6
SP4 03:39 ✓ BCrypt 192 1 024 Spring Library 128 6
SP5 03:44 ✗ 0
Table 4: Evaluation of the Implemented Solutions
S=Spring, J=JSF, P=Priming, N=Non-Priming (See Table 1 for labeling.)
In contrast, JP2 decided to not use bcrypt as he did not trust the
library source. Further reasons for choosing a library were past
experience. SP2 decided on MD5 because he had used it before. JP4
would have also used MD5 if the task had not asked for security:
“I would have used MD5 because I was already com-
fortable with it and so I wouldn’t have thought it had
vulnerability.”
4.3 Expectations and Experiences With the
Task
In order to evaluate the task difficulty before and after implemen-
tation, we asked our participants to rate their expectations and
experiences. The table summarizing the before and after ratings
can be found in the Appendix (see Table 7). We additionally report
the mean values of expectation and experience with regard to the
priming/non-priming and framework support scenarios. However,
these values have to be regarded with care since the main purpose
of qualitative research is to explore a phenomenon in depth and
not to generate quantitative results4. On a seven-point rating scale
(1: Very difficult - 7: Very easy) the mean values for the non-primed
group were 4 before and 4.1 after working on the task. The mean
values for the primed group were 3.7 before and 3.8 after working
on the task.
4It should be considered that our sample is small and not all groups indicate a normal
distribution. The individual values can be found in Table 7 (see Appendix).
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Before the implementation phase, our primed participants rated
the task difficulty slightly more difficult than the non-primed par-
ticipants. This might indicate that our participants acknowledged
the security overhead to increase the difficulty of the task. This
bears further examination in the future since such a perception
might make developers shy away from security code.
Comparing the mean values of the framework support scenarios,
the groups had nearly similar mean values (Spring: 3.8, JSF: 3.9)
before the task implementation. After the task, however, the mean
value of experience changed to 4.3 for Spring and 3.6 for JSF. This
might indicate that the participants perceived solving the task with
JSF as more complex than solving it with Spring.
Further, we observed that participants who implemented solu-
tions with a low security score (JP3, SP2), e.g. because of using
weak hash functions, rated the difficulty of the task as rather low.
SP2 stated that he used MD5 because he had already used it in previ-
ous applications. His self-reported familiarity with the task could
explain his rating. All other participants who were able to securely
implement the task indicated it as more difficult.
We observed no noticeable trends in the expected difficulty and
performance of the participants. The participants from the primed
group who added (limited) security gave a similar rating (JP3, SP1,
SP3) or even a slightly better rating (JP2, JP4, SP2, SP4) after imple-
mentation. However, the participants who were not able to store
passwords securely rated the task slightly more difficult (JP1, JP5)
after the implementation phase. This indicates that they underesti-
mated the complexity of the security part of the task.
4.4 Code Self-Assessment vs. Actual Security
The participants’ code self-assessment sometimes differed from
the solutions they actually implemented. Table 5 summarizes the
security knowledge of each participant and the participants’ self-
assessment regarding their own solution we learned from the in-
terviews compared to our security-score. Furthermore, their esti-
mations on whether they would solve the task differently in a real
company are listed in the table.
Lacking knowledge of hashing and salting does not necessarily
lead to insecure code, nor vice versa. With the exception of SP3 and
JN1, all participants presented at least a basic knowledge of hashing.
A number of participants (JN1, JN2, JN5, JP1, JP4, JP5, SN5, SP3,
SP5) did not know the definition of salting. The other participants
explained that salting prevents usage of rainbow tables, thereby
adding an additional level of security. While JP3 and SP2 assumed
that they implemented the password storage securely, they in fact
did not. SP3 was not able to explain hashing or salting correctly
but managed to store the passwords securely by using the Spring
helper classes. He stated:
“Every time you put a password in it, e.g. ‘password’,
you get each time another hash.”
Although his implementation was not functional and his under-
standing of hashing not correct, he was able solve the task securely.
By contrast, the participants from the non-primed Spring group
all showed a deeper understanding of hashing during the inter-
views, but did not store the end-user password securely. Also, in
the primed Spring group, SP2 for instance could explain hashing
and salting properly, but only gained a security score of 1/7.
What is more, in our pilot studies some participants mentioned
that they would have implemented a different solution if the task
was assigned in an actual company. This is a problem many studies
face. To get insights into this we asked our participants whether
their solution from the study would differ from the one they would
implement for a company.
Almost all participants stated that they would have solved the
task in a better way. SP3 and JN5 stated that in a company they
would ask for help. Interestingly, some participants explained that
there would be a security expert or supervisor who would check
for and require security:
“I would ask my supervisor about it. [...] There is
definitely another person that understood these kinds
of things.” (JN3)
The participants expected somebody to set security as a requirement
or explicitly request it. SN3 and JN4 mentioned that the security of
their solutions depend on the company:
“It depends on the company. If it had been a security
company I would have thought of something because
they would have minded.” (SN3)
JN4 goes even further saying that it depends on the data the com-
pany is handling:
“Depends on the company data. If the data would be
e.g. medical data, there would be other requirements.”
(JN4)
SP2 also thinks the responsibility lies with the employer or the
company itself. He stated:
“If the employer did not really constrain the program-
mer with certain requirements, then the programmer
will do the work in, let’s say, not in a sufficient way.”
Other participants stated that if they had more time to get used
to working with the framework, they would be able to produce a
better solution.
4.5 Experienced Spring/JSF Support
Table 3 shows the agreement of all participants on whether the
framework they used supported or prevented them from storing
passwords securely.
7 of the non-primed participants specified an undecided rating
in the middle of the scale. SN3, for example, augmented his answer
with these words:
“I would say, that I’m undecided or don’t know if it
would have supported me, because I didn’t look for
it”
And to the prevention-related question he stated: “Actually the
same answer.”
Particularly interesting are the answers of participants belonging
to the primed group regarding the framework support. While 3 of
the 5 participants who were using Spring, managed to store the
passwords securely, and thus, agreed that Spring supported them
(SP1, SP3, SP4), all participants from the primed group using JSF
disagreed that JSF supported them. Most participants that used JSF
even answered that the framework prevented them from storing
the password securely. JP4 mentioned:
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Secure storage Hashing Salting Company
Security-Score
(7)
Own Opinion Basic
Understanding
Deeper
Understanding
Deeper
Understanding
Believed Have
Used
Similar Solution Further Code
Improvement
JN1 0 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
JN2 0 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
JN3 0 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ -
JN4 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
JN5 0 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
JP1 0 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ - -
JP2 5.5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
JP3 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
JP4 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ -
JP5 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ -
SN1 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ -
SN2 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
SN3 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
SN4 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
SN5 0 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
SP1 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -
SP2 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
SP3 6 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
SP4 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SP5 0 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Table 5: Participants’ Security Knowledge and Code Self-Assessment
S=Spring, J=JSF, P=Priming, N=Non-Priming (See Table 1 for labeling.)
“I thought of finding something within the JSF Frame-
work or within a Java framework which easily gives
a hash function or they can use it easily but I couldn’t
get anything.”
SP1, for example, in answering why the Spring Framework sup-
ported him, said:
“Because it has the built in library bcrypt for exam-
ple and some strong validation framework for the
password.”
This observation could suggest that developers, who are told
that a secure storage is a requirement, first look for a library in the
framework they are working with and - if they find it - are willing
to use it for the task.
Other participants gave Spring as the reason for why they did
not manage to store the end-user password securely. SN4 explained:
“Because there are too many possibilities to imple-
ment user password hashing and Spring works in a
way that it uses an authentication manager or some-
thing specific to Spring and one needs to extend the ap-
plication to create this encryption or hashing schema.”
SN4 even had a bad experience with Spring in his past job and
stated that it was the main reason he quit the job. Further, SN2 felt
that Spring hindered him from storing passwords securely because
he did not know where to include his code into the framework. An-
other participant noted that JSF supported secure password storage
“Because it provides that validation thing” (JN5).
Some participants were not familiar with Hibernate and experi-
enced difficulties with inserting data from the form to the database
(JP2, JN5). JP3 had problems with MVC in general, and had to work
into it before working with it. Further, some participants needed
more time to get familiar with the frameworks (SN4, SN1).
4.6 Priming vs. Non-Priming Scenario
None of the 10 non-primed participants implemented a secure
solution. The reasons for this outcome are many and varied. Most
of the participants mentioned that the task description did not
require it, or rather they did not know it was a requirement (JN2,
JN3, JN5, SN1, SN2, SN3, SN4, SN5). While this may seem obvious,
there is still a potentially important lesson to learn from this. Even
though we would expect that developers should realize that storing
passwords is a security critical task, some did not even make that
connection, as the following quotes indicate:
“Umm, actually literally when I was in the project
I didn’t feel much like that it was related to secu-
rity.” (JN5)
“I thought the purpose of the study is not about secu-
rity so I didn’t do it.” (JN2)
Even if JN5 was aware of security in general he did not attempt
to store the end-user password securely, because his task did not
explicitly ask him to do so. Others did not think of security at all.
For instance, JN2 noted:
“It was like just to store information in tables and I
didn’t notice that, I should store password securely.”
During the completion of the exit survey, some participants rec-
ognized that secure password storage might be part of their task.
Participants were asked, whether they believe they had stored the
end-user password securely. JN2, e.g., noted:
“When I completed the task until then I didn’t notice
this, but when I started filling the form, the survey
form at the end of the task, then I felt that I missed
this point.”
What is more, one non-primed participant struggled with the
Spring Framework. He reasoned it was hard to find a way to solve
the task securely “because there are too many possibilities to im-
plement user password hashing...” and that he “would need more
time to get familiar with the system” (SN4).
By contrast, 7 of 10 primed participants at least hashed the pass-
words and stored them on the database. SP1 explained that even if
he would not have been primed he would have stored the passwords
securely, since his colleague experienced the downsides of insecure
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password storage. SP2 also claimed that he would have stored the
end-user passwords securely even if he had not been told to do so.
However, he only used MD5 to secure the passwords. Finally, when
JP1 was asked why he stored the password in plain text, he gave
this candid answer:
“I’m lazy.”
This represents one of the main findings of our work. Even in
a task so obviously security-related, participants who were not
explicitly told to securely store the end-user passwords did not.
While part of this effect can be explained by the fact that the par-
ticipants knew that they were in a study, it is still important to
note that not all of our participants linked password storage to a
security-sensitive task. Thus we find that, similar to misperceptions
end-users have about their password behavior, developers have
misperceptions of their own, which we need to combat. Section 4.7
goes into more detail on this matter.
Another important take-away is that developer studies need to
take care when framing their tasks, since we saw a very large effect.
Giving developers small focused tasks concerning crypto libraries
will not reveal all the problems we saw in the more realistic context
of complex tasks which mix security and functionality development.
Both types of studies are worthwhile; however, the decision needs
to be taken consciously according to the goal of the studies.
4.7 Misconceptions of Secure Password Storage
When we asked our participants what storing passwords securely
means, some stated that the passwords need to have certain con-
straints and be validated for security, e.g. character length (JN5).
It became clear that some participants assume that securing pass-
words includes validation of the passwords on the end-user side
instead of secure storage in the database on the developer side.
What is particularly interesting is that developers were applying
end-user security advice but not developer security advice. Another
interesting finding is that one participant said that her solution is
optimal because she tried to switch on SSL and secure the password
transmission. JN1 saw no reason for hashing the passwords, stating:
“I assumed that the connection will be a secure con-
nection likewith anHTTPS connection, so everything
should come encrypted.”
Further, some participants had never heard of, let alone could ex-
plain, hashing or salting a password (JN1, SP3).
SP2 was sure that MD5 is secure. He was not aware of the conse-
quences of using the broken hash function and even stated:
“MD5 with complicated salt is pretty secure.”
5 LIMITATIONS
Below, we discuss the limitations of our study.
Population: Firstly, we used only computer science students in-
stead of real developers. While related work from the field of empir-
ical software engineering shows that students can be good proxies
for real developers, it is still important to remember that there are
differences between the two groups. Particularly, we want to under-
line that a lot of software development skills come from experience,
which can be markedly absent from students. Secondly, all students
were recruited from the same CS environment. While such a ho-
mogenous group enables a better comparison between the different
conditions, it limits generalizability. Thus, no generalizability is
claimed. Thirdly, despite 20 participants being a good number for a
qualitative study, the high variability of skill and experience levels
means that our results need to be backed up by follow-up work
with larger scale studies.
Laboratory environment: The laboratory environment which
allowed us to gather very rich and in-depth data also introduced
an environmental bias. Participants knew they were part of a study
and not working with real data. We used the common technique of
role-playing to counter this as best we could; however, some partici-
pants nonetheless self-reported that they would have behaved more
securely if they were given the same task in a company. We cannot
quantify the effective size of this bias, since it is also possible that
such claims were made out of embarrassment to cover for mistakes.
Programming language:We selected Java as a programming
language to ensure that our entire population sample had exper-
tise in it. It is the main teaching language at our university, so our
students are all familiar with it. It is entirely possible that other
programming languages and libraries would produce different re-
sults. Further work is needed to make any kind of generalizable
statements.
Study length: We would like to point out the length of the
study as another limitation. We picked a whole working day as the
length due to the complexity of the task, but refrained from using
a multi-day time frame, since it would introduce uncertainty as
to what participants did in their off-hours. Acar et al. show that
the used information sources have a big effect and we need to be
able to capture that [2]. We conducted extensive pilot studies to
tailor the tasks to the time available and did not note any fatigue
effects. Nonetheless, the study length is sure to have an effect - in
particular in comparison to the very short studies carried out in
related work [1–3, 68].Whether short, one-day, or multi-day studies
are more ecologically valid is unknown and must be examined
further in future work.
Overall, at present this study should be seen as the first step to
offer insights into an extremely complex problem, and the results
need to be interpreted as such. Our results need to be replicated and
further methodological research is called for. All the above limita-
tions need to be studied and expanded on. In particular, future work
should examine different types of developers such as volunteers
from online forums, for-hire developers, local developers, etc. and
different task descriptions and task settings.
6 DISCUSSION
Developers are responsible for the software they implement. In-
terestingly, a number of our participants did not feel responsible
for security when it was not explicitly mentioned. This is a sur-
prising similarity to end-users who see security as a secondary
task. Getting developers to care about security is essential in order
to produce software which protects its users. However, our study
shows that there is still much we do not know on why developers
behave the way they do. In particular, the insights gained from the
qualitative approach proved to be enlightening to us since it goes
beyond simply quantifying where the problems lie.
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Some participants used weak hash functions like MD5 or SHA256
without key stretching simply because they were either not aware
of the issues or had no negative experiences with them.
People tend to use the hash functions, they are familiar with
- even if they have heard about more secure hash functions. Al-
though in general non-primed participants did not consider secure
password storage, most of them showed a deeper understanding
of it when prompted in the interviews. They were able to explain
in detail how they would hash and salt an end-user password. Ad-
ditionally, most participants were able to identify hash algorithms
that were less recommended by referring to community discussions.
None of our participants used a memory-hard hashing function
to store the end-user passwords securely, even though Spring Se-
curity offers an implementation of scrypt and participants could
have used it just as easily as bcrypt. This highlights the need for
academics to intensify the push of research results into tutorials,
standardization bodies, and frameworks. Another solution worth
exploring is removing less secure options from libraries. This solu-
tion needs to be studied with care since it creates issues of backward
compatibility which might create worse security problems in the
long run. However, the fact that not a single participant used state
of the art memory-hard hashing functions is a troubling discovery
and one that calls for urgent action.
Secure password storage was regarded from different perspec-
tives in our study. Some participants thought their job was to ensure
that end-users behaved securely, e.g. by setting constraints to pass-
word length and strength. Other participants thought that using
encrypted transmission would achieve secure password storage.
This highlights that developers have similar security misconcep-
tions as end-users. Even though developers show greater theoretical
knowledge of security concepts, this is no guarantee that they will
use them or even acknowledge their necessity in their software.
Overall, our study indicates that, even when frameworks with
better security support can help, priming is essential to produce
secure applications. Developers need to be told explicitly about
what kind of security to add and they need help in avoiding outdated
security mechanisms.
7 CONCLUSION
It is important to find out why some developers store end-user
passwords securely, while others do not. One assumption is that
the amount of support the API offers to developers has an impact
on secure password storage. However, our study suggests that API
usability is not the main factor; in addition to the factor of docu-
mentation discovered by Acar et al. [2], task framing and developer
misconceptions play a very important role in the (in)security of
code created by developers.
We designed a laboratory study with four scenarios in order to
analyze the different behaviors and motives of developers when
implementing a password storage task. We selected two popular
Web application frameworks with different levels of built-in support
for secure password storage, Spring and JSF. Additionally, one group
was told that the purpose of the study was to examine the usability
of Java frameworks while the other group was explicitly told the
study was about security and was directed to store the passwords
securely. The key observations from our study are as follows:
Developers think of functionality before security.We con-
ducted semi-structured interviews immediately after the partici-
pants finished working on the implementation task. The interviews
provided us valuable insights into developers’ perceptions of task
accomplishment. Just as security is a secondary task for most end-
users, our developers stated that they always concentrated on the
functionality of the task first before (if at all) thinking of security.
Asking for security can make a difference. Our results indi-
cate that there are big differences if a developer is explicitly asked
to consider security. None of our non-primed participants thought
that the task of storing passwords needed a secure solution, despite
password storage obviously being a security sensitive task. By con-
trast, participants who were advised to store the end-user password
securely used various hash functions with different configurations.
The configurations varied in their level of security. Most partici-
pants of the primed Spring group made use of Spring Security’s
PasswordEncoder interface. Thus, they were less likely to make
mistakes.
Standards and advice matter. None of the participants who
attempted to implement secure password storage produced a so-
lution that met current academic standards. This needs to be seen
as a call to action for academics to find better ways to disseminate
the latest results in standards and tutorials as well as integrate
them with popular frameworks. For the latter option, the trade-off
between backward compatibility, flexibility, and security needs to
be re-examined.
Opt-out security. At present, even frameworks which have
high-level support for secure password storage offer this in an
opt-in manner, i.e. developers have to know and want to use this
feature. Based on the many misconceptions and lack of primary-
task motivation, it would be beneficial to offer safe defaults. This
is an open research problem, since it is non-trivial to recognize
when developers are writing passwords in plain text as opposed to
other strings across frameworks and IDEs. Ensuring that developers
cannot accidentally store a password in plain text or with weak
security is a difficult challenge, but one worth tackling.
This study only presents a first qualitative look at password
storage as a research problem. In future work, studies are needed to
validate and extend the results. Firstly, our student sample limits the
generalizability; thus, studies involving programmers with different
skills and backgrounds from companies as well as freelancers are
needed. Secondly, it is necessary to increase the sample size, in
order to gather quantitative data. Thirdly, once the problem is fully
understood, work needs to begin on creating more usable password
storage solutions to help developers with this critical task.
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APPENDIX
A RECRUITMENT INVITATION
Participant invitation for scientific studies
Dear computer science students, We are conducting several scientific studies, in which
you can participate and earn 100 euros!
Details:
The institute for Computer Science of the University of Bonn is looking for motivated
Computer Science Students (over 18), who want to take part in a scientific study with
the topic of Web Development in Java and to earn some extra money. The goal of the
study is to test the usability of different Java web development APIs. In the study you
will be asked to implement parts of a web application. Basic knowledge of Java and
the IDE Eclipse is required. The study will last 8 hours. Afterwards we will conduct a
short interview and ask some questions about the tasks. The interview will be audio
recorded to facilitate the evaluation of results. The aim of the study is not to test your
knowledge but the usability of the APIs. All data gathered during the study will be
anonymized. Anonymized data and quotes may be published as part of a scientific
publication. Your consent will be requested on the day you participate. You will be
payed 100 euros for taking part in the study. Knowledge required: IDE Eclipse, JAVA
Interested? Please fill in the following questionnaire to register your interest: LINK We
are looking for a good mix of skills, so please fill out the questionnaire as accurately
as possible. We are looking for up to 120 participants. Registering your interest does
not guarantee participation.
B PRE-SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE
• Gender:
– Female, Male, Other, Prefer not to say
• Which university are you at?
– University of Bonn
– Other:
• In which program are you currently enrolled?
– Bachelor Computer Science
– Master Computer Science
– Other:
• Your semester:
• How familiar are you with Java?
1: Not familiar at all - 7: Very familiar
• How familiar are you with PostgreSQL?
1: Not familiar at all - 7: Very familiar
• How familiar are you with Hibernate?
1: Not familiar at all - 7: Very familiar
• How familiar are you with Eclipse IDE?
1: Not familiar at all - 7: Very familiar
C SURVEY
• Expectation asked before solving the task:
What is your expectation? Overall, this task is?
1: Very difficult - 7: Very easy
• Experience asked after solving the task:
Overall, this task was ...? 1: Very difficult - 7: Very easy
• I have a good understanding of security concepts. (Q1)
1: Strongly disagree - 7: Strongly agree
• How often do you ask for help facing security problems? (Q2)
1: Never - 7: Every time
• How often are you asked for help when somebody is facing security
problems? (Q3) 1: Never - 7: Every time
• How often do you need to add security to the software you develop
in general (Primed Group: apart from this study)? (Q4)
1: Never - 7: Every time
• How often have you stored passwords in the software you have
developed (Primed Group: apart from this study)?
1: Never - 7: Every time
• How would you rate your background/knowledge with regard to
secure password storage in a database? 1: Not knowledgeable at
all - 7: Very knowledgeable
• Do you think that you stored the end-user passwords securely?
• The Web framework (Spring/JSF) supported me in storing the end-
user password securely. 1: Strongly disagree - 7: Strongly agree
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How familiar are you with
Not familiar at all (1) - Very familiar (7)
Gender University Study program Age Nationality Semester Java PostgreSQL Hibernate Eclipse IDE Total skills
JN1 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science NA Bangladeshi 8 6 4 4 6 20
JN2 Female University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 23 Pakistani 3 3 1 1 6 11
JN3 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 25 Uzbek 2 5 3 2 5 15
JN4 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 23 German 6 5 2 1 6 14
JN5 Female University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 27 Indian 5 5 4 1 6 16
JP1 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 25 Chinese 5 5 1 1 4 11
JP2 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 22 German 4 6 6 1 6 19
JP3 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 26 Iranian 4 4 2 2 6 14
JP4 Male Aachen University MSc Media Informatics 27 Indian 2 4 2 1 3 10
JP5 Male Aachen University MSc Media Informatics 25 NA 2 2 1 1 2 6
SN1 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 24 German 10 6 4 1 5 16
SN2 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 20 German 2 7 5 2 4 18
SN3 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 24 German 8 6 3 1 6 16
SN4 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 25 Syrian 3 7 5 7 7 26
SN5 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 19 German 2 5 4 1 4 14
SP1 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 25 NA 4 4 3 2 4 13
SP2 Male University of Bonn MSc Computer Science 25 Syrian 4 6 3 4 4 17
SP3 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 20 German 2 5 3 1 4 13
SP4 Male University of Bonn BSc Computer Science 25 German 10 5 3 1 5 14
SP5 Female University of Bonn MSc Computer Science NA Indian 4 5 4 4 6 19
Table 6: Participants’ Demographics
S=Spring, J=JSF, P=Priming, N=Non-Priming (See Table 1 for labeling.)
Expectation Experience
Very difficult (1) - Very easy (7)
JN1 5 5
JN2 4 4
JN3 3 4
JN4 5 3
JN5 3 2
JP1 3 2
JP2 4 5
JP3 5 5
JP4 2 4
JP5 4 2
SN1 4 6
SN2 5 4
SN3 3 5
SN4 5 5
SN5 3 3
SP1 4 4
SP2 6 5
SP3 3 3
SP4 4 5
SP5 2 3
Table 7: Participants’ Expectation and Experience of the
Task Difficulty
S=Spring, J=JSF, P=Priming, N=Non-Priming (See Table 1 for labeling.)
• The Web framework (Spring/JSF) prevented me in storing the end-
user password securely. 1: Strongly disagree - 7: Strongly agree
D SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW
• Do you think that you have stored the end-user passwords securely
– No
∗ Why?
∗ Non-Primed Group: Were you aware that the task needed a
secure solution?
∗ What would you do, if you needed to store the end-user pass-
word securely?
– Yes (If yes, further questions below)
• What is the purpose of hashing?
• What is the purpose of salting?
• Did you hash the end-user password?
• Did you salt the end-user password?
• Did the Web framework (Spring/JSF) support you in storing the
end-user password securely? Please explain your answer.
• Did the Web framework (Spring/JSF) prevent you from storing the
end-user password securely? Please explain your answer.
• Imagine you were working in a company and you had exactly the
same task as you got today with exactly the same task description
and time constraint. Would you have solved the task in exactly the
same way as you solved it today?
• Did you solve the task functionally?
• Did you solve the task securely?
Further Interview Questions:
(If participants believe they have stored the end-user password securely.)
• Non-Primed Group: How did you become aware of the necessity of
security in this task? At which point did you decide to store the
end-user password securely?
• What did you do to store the user password securely?
• Please name all steps taken in order to store the end-user password
securely
• Do you think your solution is optimal? Why or why not?
• What were the general problems you encountered when implement-
ing secure end-user password storage?
• Primed Group: Do you think you would have stored the end-user
passwords securely if you had not been told about it? Please explain
your answer.
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E STUDY TASK FOR BOTH FRAMEWORKS
Welcome! We would like to invite you to participate in our study and thus make a valuable contribution to our research.
Our research goal is to study the usability of the Web Framework Spring/Java Server Faces (JSF). 
(Priming: We are specifically interested in the security aspects of password storage with Spring/JSF.)
Task:
Imagine, the University of Bonn wants to offer a social network, which enables students and members of the university
to communicate and interact with each other (similar to Facebook). For this purpose, a platform has to be provided 
allow users to register to the social network. 
The university has employed a team of developers who have already implemented parts of the platform. For instance, a 
front-end designer has created this interface:
A database administrator provides a database access using PostgreSQL (Object-Relational Database Management 
System (ORDBMS)) and Hibernate (Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) Framework). Another team member started to
implement the program logic, but left the team recently. 
Please help the team and complete the partially available implementation. In order to do so, please implement 
the registration process of the application. 
(Priming: We are specifically interested in the security aspects of password storage with Spring/JSF.)
In order to solve the task, you are allowed to use any kind of source available on the Internet that may be helpful or 
has valuable information. Consequently, you can search and read every website, which you believe is helpful. Further 
implementation hints can be found on the next page.
Please fill in the following survey before working on the task: LINK_TO_SURVEY
Figure 1: Back-End and Front-End
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F IMPLEMENTATION HINTS FOR JSF
Model 
 de.unibonn.socialnetJSF.model 
 
Appuser.java: 
This class is a Plain Old Java Object (also called Hibernate Entity Bean or Business Domain Object). Its state is  
persisted to a table in a relational database. Instances of such an entity correspond to individual rows in the table. 
 
1. TODO: Please add user properties (see registration.xhtml (src/main/webapp)), setters and getters etc. 
2. TODO: Please add the table appuser in the database socialnet.  
       You can also find relevant database properties here: src/main/resources/hibernate.cfg.xml 
       You can use any method you like. Software PGAdmin III can help. 
SocialnetJSF – Application Layer & Implementation Hints 
Data Layer 
de.unibonn.socialnetJSF.dao 
 
Hibernate adds a layer in between the Model and Controller: Data Access Objects (DAOs) are used as a direct line of 
connection and communication with the database. DAOs are employed when the actual “Create, Read, Update, 
Delete” operations are needed and invoked in the Java code.  
   
UserDao.java: Interface declares the methods that will be used for database interaction. 
UserDaoImpl.java: Hibernate specific DAO implementation. 
 
3. TODO: Please implement the database interactions you believe are necessary. 
Controller 
de.unibonn.socialnetJSF.controller 
 
 The controller accepts input and converts it to commands for the model or view. 
 
AppController.java: 
This class is declared to be registered as a managed bean (@ManagedBean). 
4. TODO: Please complete the implementation of this class. 
        Hint: Properties should have setter and getter to set and get values from UI. 
If any of the following terms are unclear, please use the Internet to become more familiar with them. The 
application follows the standard Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern. You only need to add programme logic 
for Model and Controller (see task sheet: Figure 1). You have 4 todos, which start in the locations listed below. 
You are free to add any additional code you believe is required. All corresponding classes can be found in the 
Project Explorer at Eclipse.  
 
In order to test/start your application:  Right mouse click on the project/Run As/Run on Server 
 
 
You have solved the task when you can store user data in the table appuser using the User Registration 
Form. (Priming: Please ensure that the user password is stored securely. ) 
 
Software used in this application: 
Java 1.7, Tomcat  7.0.70, Maven 2.2.1 , JavaServer Faces (JSF) 2.1, Hibernate 4.3.6.Final, PostgreSQL 9.4.1208 
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Model 
 de.unibonn.socialnetSpring.model 
 
Appuser.java: 
This class is a Plain Old Java Object (also called Hibernate Entity Bean or Business Domain Object). Its state is persisted  
state to a table in a relational database. Instances of such an entity correspond to individual rows in the  table. 
 
1. TODO: Please add user properties (see registration.jsp (src/main/webapp/WEB_INF/views)), setters & getters etc. 
2. TODO: Please add the table appuser in the database socialnet.  
       You can also find relevant database properties here: src/main/resources/application.properties 
       You can use any method you like. Software PGAdmin III can help. 
SocialnetSpring – Application Layer & Implementation Hints 
Data Layer 
de.unibonn.socialnetSpring.dao 
 
Spring & Hibernate add a further layer in between the Model and Controller: Data Access Objects (DAOs) are used as 
a direct line of connection and communication with the database. DAOs are employed when the actual “Create, Read, 
Update, Delete” operations are needed and invoked in the Java code.  
   
UserDao.java: Interface declares the methods that will be used for database interaction. 
UserDaoImpl.java: Hibernate specific DAO implementation. 
 
3. TODO: Please implement the database interactions you believe are necessary. 
Controller 
de.unibonn.socialnetSpring.controller 
 
 The controller accepts input and converts it to commands for the model or view. 
 
AppController.java: 
4. TODO: Please implement the saveUser()method. 
If any of the following terms are unclear, please use the Internet to become more familiar with them. The 
application follows the standard Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern. You only need to add programme logic 
for Model and Controller (see task sheet: Figure 1). You have 4 todos, which start in the locations listed below. 
You are free to add any additional code you believe is required. All corresponding classes can be found in the 
Project Explorer at Eclipse.  
 
In order to test/start your application:  Right mouse click on the project/Run As/Run on Server 
 
 
You have solved the task when you can store user data in the table appuser using the User Registration Form. 
(Priming: Please ensure that the user password is stored securely. ) 
 
Software used in this application: 
Java 1.7, Tomcat  7.0.70, Maven 2.2.1, Spring Framework 4.0.6.RELEASE, Hibernate 4.3.6.Final, PostgreSQL 9.4.1208 
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